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The Emergence of Citizen Diplomacy in European Union–
China Relations: Principles, Pillars, Pioneers, Paradoxes
Andreas Fulda
School of Politics and International Relations, Law and Social Sciences Building, University of
Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, UK
ABSTRACT
This analysis considers the phenomenon of citizen diplomacy in
European Union [EU]–China relations. It begins by engaging with
the global discourse about “new” diplomacy and outlines how
society-centric citizen diplomacy differs from state-centric public
diplomacy. After revealing that European policy-makers are only
reluctantly acknowledging the role of laymen in foreign policy-
making vis-à-vis China, it shows that whilst citizen diplomacy may
be a new concept in EU–China relations, it is actually not a new
practice. The empirical part of the exegesis traces the experiential
learning amongst 12 European citizen diplomats who have
engaged China in the activity fields of disability; psychoanalysis;
non-governmental organisation twinning; human rights; climate
change mitigation; welfare of orphans, abandoned disabled chil-
dren and young people; youth dialogue; public participation; ani-
mal welfare; and inclusive performing arts. The final partmakes use
of the newly developed hexagon of intercultural communication
and collaboration competence to reveal how the European citizen
diplomats have managed to navigate the sometimes-treacherous
political-administrative landscape in mainland China. European
citizen diplomats have made manifold and often surprising con-
tributions to China’s multifaceted development.
I have long believed, as have many before me, that peaceful relations between
nations requires understanding and mutual respect between individuals. If
only people will get together, then so eventually will nations.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 34th President of the United States1
Fortunately, we have had some recent successful experiences in the parti-
cipation of laymen in foreign relations… . Just as we can say that a citizen
army can be a top-flight instrument of war, we now can add that there is
evidence that a citizen diplomacy is a promising implement of peace.
James Marshall, United States National Commission, UNESCO2
Scholarship on EU–China relations traditionally focuses on trade and
investment and emphasises the importance of government-to-government
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ties.3 However, a sustainable partnership between Europe and China needs to
go beyond commercial and geopolitical interests of their respective govern-
ments and requires the strengthening of civil society exchanges and colla-
borative people-to-people relations.4 Light needs shedding on the under
researched phenomenon of European citizens who have—consciously or
not—put the idea of citizen diplomacy into practice. Citizen diplomacy
means an alternative problem-solving strategy underpinning the role that
non-state actors may play in mitigating difficult interstate relations and
helping resolve deep-rooted conflicts that political leaders and the private
sector cannot solve alone. Society-centric citizen diplomacy, emphasising
people-to-people exchanges, is particularly well suited to engage with what
could be termed “unofficial” China. It complements rather than replaces
state-centric institutional diplomacy,5 which will continue to be the domi-
nant means for European member-states to engage in government-to-
government relations with “official” China.
Since the beginning of China’s so-called reform and opening up period
after 1978 and until the early years of the Xi/Li administration—with the
issuing of Document No. 9 in 2013 marking a possible turning point6—
European citizen diplomats have made manifold and often surprising con-
tributions to China’s multi-faceted development. They were active partici-
pants in a “slow-motion revolution,” a process in “China where, from year
to year, there would be fewer limits on what one could talk about, and more
ways to expose official malfeasance and gain redress for basic grievances.”7
The work of Ludwig Weitz—a professional from Bonn, Germany with more
than 23 years of experience in organisational development, moderation,
training, and coaching—in mainland China can serve as a revelatory case
that elucidates the reach and significance of European citizen diplomacy in
China.8
In October 2010, Weitz facilitated a three-day workshop at the Central
Party School in Beijing. Together with Chinese Communist Party [CCP]
cadres, he jointly explored how bottom-up participatory approaches can
help reduce conflicts in Chinese communities. It was not the first time that
Weitz came to China. His China engagement began with an invitation to
an international conference on “Development of Grassroots Democracy
through Public Participation” in Beijing in December 2005. Weitz’s pre-
sentation on citizen participation in German communities captured the
imagination of Chinese conference participants. In 2006, he started to
work with the Beijing-based government-organised non-governmental
organisation [GONGO], the China Association for Non-governmental
Organisation Co-operation [CANGO], and its member organisation
Shining Stone Community Action [SSCA], a civil society organisation
that aims for more inclusive forms of community governance in China.
During annual capacity building workshops—supported by German and
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American funders and facilitated with the help of either CANGO or SSCA
—Weitz subsequently introduced participatory big-group moderation tech-
niques to Chinese civil society practitioners working in the field of social
development and environmental protection. During these workshops,
which usually lasted from one to three days, participants learnt from
Weitz how to understand and apply participatory methods with imagina-
tive titles such as “Future Search Conference,” “Open Space,”
“Appreciative Inquiry,” “World Café,” and “Mediation.”9
Weitz subsequently gained a reputation that soon extended beyond the
confines of Beijing’s civil society. In 2010, Professor Jin Wei, deputy director
of the Teaching and Research Office of the Social Development Theory
Institute under the School of the Central Committee of the CCP, started to
take an interest in his work and joined one of his Open Space capacity
building workshops for Chinese civil society practitioners. Jin, an expert on
Xinjiang and Tibet, had developed a professional interest since 2001 in
strengthening human immunodeficiency virus prevention.10 She understood
that only radically different forms and methods of public engagement would
allow her and her colleagues to have a greater impact at the grassroots level.
Encouraged by personal recommendations from Chinese civil society practi-
tioners, she decided to invite Weitz to work with her co-workers in autumn
2010. This willingness to take political risks when employing the German
facilitator paid off: after three days of dialogue and deliberation, the work-
shop ended with an emotional round of participants providing positive
feedback and a cultural event in the evening, where workshop participants
sang German and Chinese songs. News about the successful conduct of the
workshop soon started to spread within Beijing’s development aid scene.
Development practitioners subsequently asked Weitz the same question
repeatedly: how was it possible to conduct a highly participatory workshop
on the issue of conflict prevention on behalf of China’s Central Party School?
They were puzzled. Could foreigners, as outsiders, play a critical and con-
structive role in China’s social and political development after all?11 Whilst it
remains an open question whether or not such European civic activism in
China can continue under the conditions of Xi Jinping’s hard authoritarian-
ism since 2012, this analysis takes stock of the principles and practices of
citizen diplomacy that have emerged in EU–China relations over the past 35
to 40 years.
This research draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources,
including foreign policy documents as well as academic literature in the fields
of diplomacy, EU–China relations, cross-cultural communication and colla-
boration, and psychoanalytical anthropology. It also employs an ethno-
graphic research approach comprising participant observation during
project work in China over a 13-year period—2003 to 2015. There is also
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a series of in-depth interviews with 12 Europeans citizen diplomats, both in
person and via Skype, over a three-year period between 2014 and 2017.
This analysis explains how citizen diplomacy situates in the discourse
about “new” diplomacy and discusses to what extent European policy-
making towards China has already integrated the concept of citizen diplo-
macy. European citizen diplomats have a long track record of working with
mainland Chinese partners in the activity fields of disability; psychoanalysis;
non-governmental organisation [NGO] twinning; human rights; climate
change mitigation; welfare of orphans, abandoned disabled children and
young people; youth dialogue; public participation’ animal welfare; and
inclusive performing arts. The work of these European citizen diplomats in
the various distinctive and yet interrelated activity fields is best understood
through the newly developed analytical lens of the hexagon of intercultural
communication and collaboration competence. European China engagement
is at its best when enlightened about its own goals and Europeans are willing
and able to engage with Chinese citizens in a politically and culturally
sensitive way. Can policy-makers leverage citizen diplomacy or does any
kind of instrumentalisation of citizen diplomats undermine their ability to
facilitate emergent impacts? How does “genuine interpersonal interaction
that is independent of any state agenda”12 help Europeans and Chinese
citizens go beyond the narrow trade and investment interests of their respec-
tive governments and jointly reimagine an EU–China relationship that also
takes shared humanitarian, cultural, and ecological concerns into account?
The concept of citizen diplomacy is not new. James Marshall, a law
professional who worked for a wide range of United States-based national
and international public sector organisations after the Second World War,
first articulated it.13 In his landmark essay, “International Affairs: Citizen
Diplomacy,” he reflected on his work for the United States National
Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation. He bemoaned that “we have not democratized foreign
affairs”14 and that “[they] are still the business of technicians. They remain
the preserve of foreign offices.”15 Marshall argued that diplomacy needed to
open up to the public domain to regain democratic legitimacy: “Not until
there is broader participation in the planning, the development, and the
execution of foreign policy can it be said that the people take part in their
own foreign relations.”16 Throughout his essay, he fervently made the case
for the inclusion of laymen in foreign policy-making and vented his frustra-
tion against “the political technician and the bureaucrat [who] simply treat
the layman as one who lives on the wrong side of the tracks of wisdom.”17
Marshall, who died in New York City at the age of 90 on 11 August 1986, was
ahead of his time. Only throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the concept of
citizen diplomacy gradually gained currency amongst both international
relations experts and foreign policy-makers. The integration of laymen into
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foreign policy making does not signify a departure from the state-centric
nature of official diplomacy. Instead, it signifies the desire amongst foreign
policy-makers to leverage the networks of highly connected individuals to
serve official foreign policy goals.
Paul Sharp has argued
revolutions in information and communication technologies, together with the
worldwide rise in democratic expectations to which both revolutions contribute so
much, have greatly strengthened the plausibility of the claim that the era of the
ordinary person has finally arrived in international relations. In response to these
changes a new series of hyphenated diplomacies (citizen-diplomacy, cyber-
diplomacy, field-diplomacy, track two–diplomacy, public-diplomacy) has emerged
to which the professionals must become hep [sic] or fade into irrelevance.18
John Robert Kelley similarly argues, “the age of diplomacy as an institution is
giving way to an age of diplomacy as a behaviour.”19 He observed that
[as] the state continues to cede more ground to the empowered nonstate actor, five
principal features of the future of diplomacy are unfolding. The current state of
diplomatic institutions can be characterised as fragmenting, dividing its powers
amongst a broad range of state and nonstate actors and institutions. At the same
time, diplomacy is becoming more public: the “global public domain” is integrat-
ing social and technological networks to harness its developing diplomatic cap-
abilities. New diplomacy possesses an advantage in its agility, relies on grassroots
mobilisation, and highlights the relevance of policy entrepreneurs. Official diplo-
macy is and shall remain superior in areas of accountability and legitimacy,
continuing to capitalise on its close proximity to policymakers. New diplomats
are competing with government action as well as compensating for government
inaction.20
A recent conference report commissioned by the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and published by Wilton Park with the support of
the East West Institute suggests foreign policy-makers are indeed warming
up to the inclusion of non-state actors in diplomatic affairs. The conference
rapporteur, James Pamment, acknowledges that “[diplomacy] is too impor-
tant to be left to diplomats”21 and asks “[how] should the formal hierarchies
of governments and their diplomatic institutions respond to ad-hoc networks
driven by tremendous expertise, legitimacy and capacities to influence?”22
Furthermore, Pamment outlines that “[many] actors have the ability to
impact upon diplomatic issues”23 and that “[the] new ‘normal’ for diplomacy
is complex, multi-faceted campaigns conducted in multiple arenas with
multiple partners.”24 Whilst the conference report’s rhetoric suggests
a major departure from conventional state-centric diplomacy, a closer look
reveals a continued emphasis on enhancing a nation’s soft power through
public diplomacy. In words of the originator of the term, Joseph Nye, “soft
power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people
rather than coerces them.”25 A core objective of new diplomacy is to
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strengthen diplomacy as an institution.26 Such an understanding suggests
that “new” diplomacy remains a government-directed effort, in which private
citizens as laymen are supposed to complement but not replace institutional
diplomacy.
In stark contrast, Marc Gopin, a former Orthodox rabbi, turned scholar
and practitioner in the United States, has called for a society-centric
citizen diplomacy that operates more independently from institutional
diplomacy. In his view, “[citizen] diplomacy is an activity that is much
larger than merely religion and conflict resolution. It refers to a whole
variety of ways in which individual citizens across the planet are engaged
in efforts to reach out to civilizations and countries that may be in conflict
with their own.”27 The case emerges for bottom-up “citizen diplomacy as
a cornerstone of the new global social contract, a path to weaving together
a new human civilization, even in the hardest places on earth.”28 For
Gopin,
[citizen] diplomacy is often at the frontier of exposing radicalized and cloistered
populations to the idea of a global community. The more sealed off a citizenry is
from the rest of the world due to an authoritarian regime, the more potential do
citizen diplomats have to make a difference where no one else can. A good citizen
diplomat with the right connections can often enter into situations where NGOs
and formal international projects are uninvited.29
Weitz’s 2010 workshop on conflict resolution at China’s Central Party School
is a good example of Gopin’s conception of society-centric citizen diplomacy.
By contributing to administrative reforms within the party-state, Weitz
opened up new spaces for Chinese citizens to engage with cadres in a more
egalitarian and open-ended way. Participatory big-group moderation techni-
ques such as “Future Search Conferences,” “Open Space,” and “Appreciative
Inquiry” facilitate the inclusion of key stakeholders ranging from commu-
nity-based organisations, consumer groups, disabled self-help groups, educa-
tional organisations such as schools and universities, local authorities,
migrant organisations, social and environmental NGOs, and women’s groups
to youth volunteer organisations. They allow organisers actively to involve
reform-minded cadres, civil society practitioners, public intellectuals, educa-
tors, journalists, lawyers, urban community residents, and rural migrants in
egalitarian and action-oriented dialogue.30 Nevertheless, how does such citi-
zen diplomacy exist in the wider context of EU–China relations? Is it an
outcome of a purely private initiative of a committed European citizen or can
it be an intended consequence of European foreign policy-making towards
China?
Mirroring the highly gradualist opening of institutional diplomacy to non-
state actors, European policy-makers concerned with China policy similarly
have only reluctantly started to acknowledge the central role of laymen in
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EU–China relations. However, to what extent can one speak of a European
China policy? One argument is that
looking at the sum of the multitude of different forms of relations that are
conducted between the EU and China, it can be claimed that there is a China
policy of the EU. This policy is determined by a variety of interests, from the
governments of the EU member states, from interest groups, from the EU institu-
tions (the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament) and
from the legal framework of the EU/EC treaties.”31
The proliferation of European China policy papers—six between 1995 and
2013—couched in the political rhetoric of strategic partnership, interests,
competition, challenges, and responsibilities supports this view.
In 2009, John Fox and François Godement, two political thinkers, issued
a scathing critique of European China engagement. In a widely cited policy
paper, “A Power Audit of EU–China Relations,” they critiqued Europe’s
efforts to shape China in its own image. Positing that “China’s foreign and
domestic policy has evolved in a way that has paid little heed to European
values, and today Beijing regularly contravenes or even undermines them,”32
they argue that Europe’s unconditional engagement with China has led to
a situation where the CCP has learned “to exploit the divisions among EU
Member States.”33 Yet, whereas Fox and Godement seek to improve
European China policy through more co-ordination amongst member-
states, an alternative problem-solving approach exists. Instead of increasing
centralised command and control mechanisms, European foreign policy-
makers could also devolve more power to European and Chinese societies.
Some of the reasons for the disappointing performance of the rather young
EU–China strategic partnership until now refer not only to policy co-
operation but also to broader societal dimensions. These include a low
level of trust between the respective political elites as well as between both
societies; the “conceptual gaps” of a shared, mutual understanding and partly
diverging cultural values due to different historical journeys; and positioning
in the international system. Citizen diplomacy has to make essential con-
tributions to generate inter-cultural trust and develop a deeper mutual
understanding including shared but differentiated narratives of global and
bilateral issues.
Convinced of the need for fundamental change to improve the EU–China
relationship, Eberhard Sandschneider, the former director of the German
Council on Foreign Relations (2003–2016), echoes these views. He points out
that a
lack of trust and mutual respect characterizes Western-Chinese relations to such
an extent that it impairs core strategic interests on both sides. Despite hundreds of
delegations and thousands of exchange students, both China and the West are far
194 A. FULDA
from reaching a level of mutual understanding necessary for enduring and sustain-
able bilateral relations.34
In his view, “[cultural] diplomacy could be the best, and may be the only,
instrument to help bridge these gaps of mutual misunderstanding. Cultural
diplomacy is therefore not only an integral but also an extremely important
element of foreign policy. It fulfils the significant function of bringing people
together who are living in different cultural worlds, using different codes of
communication and different sets of rules.”35 The former German ambassa-
dor to China, Volker Stanzel (2004–2007), shares this assessment:
“Governments on their own can only achieve so much. This then is the
field of civil society and the day-to-day encounters in shared experience.
Only the innumerable actors that constitute a ‘civil society’ have the com-
bined potential to initiate an exchange of knowledge on values, philosophies,
and visions that may come to constitute a robust basis upon which political
and economic leaders can build.”36
Despite pleas from German China experts and diplomats to do more to
include European and Chinese citizens, geopolitical concerns and commer-
cial interests continue to loom large in EU–China relations. The “EU–China
Dialogue Architecture,” drawn up by the European External Action Service,
is a case in point. It distinguishes between a first pillar of political dialogue
and a second of economic and sectoral discussion. Only in April 2012, a third
concerning people-to-people dialogue was established. People-to-people
exchanges are “a longstanding notion underpinning any action aiming to
enhance international understanding and friendship through educational,
cultural and humanitarian activities involving the exchange of ideas and
experiences directly among peoples of different countries and diverse
cultures.”37 Horst Fabian, the EU–China Civil Society ambassador, has criti-
cised the High Level People-to-People Dialogue as “rather vague.”38
The “EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” best illustrates
the lack of strategic vision and ambition for people-to-people exchanges
between Europe and China.39 In this joint declaration, adopted alongside
the 16th EU–China Summit in Beijing on 21 November 2013, the fourth and
rather short final part relates to people-to-people exchanges. Here, European
and Chinese policy-makers are remarkably unimaginative and limit their
support to culture, education, and youth as well as to the facilitation of
people-to-people exchanges primarily in the field of tourism. Addressing
the under-utilisation of citizen diplomacy, Fabian has suggested that the
third pillar should “be accompanied by an agreement among leading
European and Chinese umbrella civil society organisations. In terms of
political-administrative procedures there should be routine screening proce-
dures in every new and continued EU–China cooperation project to ascertain
the possible space for civil society cooperation.”40 The discussion about the
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under-developed third pillar suggests that perhaps rather than the Chinese
party-state’s intransigence, it appears that the reluctance to experiment with
Europe’s new China engagement approaches renders it equally culpable.
What European foreign policy-makers seem to lack is what Brazilian educa-
tor Paulo Freire has referred to as “faith in people.”41 Shortcomings in
European China policy-making stand in great contrast to the evolving prac-
tices of European citizen diplomats in China.
The discussion of “new” diplomacy as well as the critique of the current
state of EU–China relations has shown that International Relations experts
and diplomats increasingly see a role for laymen in foreign policy-making.
The increasing use of political rhetoric ranging from people-to-people
exchanges, cultural diplomacy to citizen diplomacy supports this view. But
whilst citizen diplomacy may be a new concept in EU–China relations, it
should be noted that it actually is not a new practice.
A historical perspective can help to compare and contrast how individual
European individuals have engaged China both past and present. In his
seminal work, To Change China, the American historian, Jonathan Spence,
portrayed the work of 16 Western advisors in China, many of whom were
from Europe. Spence observed that “their cumulative lives [had] a curious
continuity. They experienced similar excitement and danger, entertained
similar hopes, learned to bear with similar frustrations, and operated with
a combination of integrity and deviousness. They bared their own souls and
mirrored their own societies in their actions, yet in doing so they highlighted
fundamental Chinese values.”42 Whilst empathising with his protagonists to
some extent, Spence also fiercely deprecated Western advisors for their
apparent sense of superiority. Concluding his study by stating, “[on] bal-
ance… . the story of these men is more a cautionary tale than an inspirational
tract,”43 he outlined negative personal attributes such as “arrogance, impa-
tience, intolerance, tactlessness, or stupidity that at different times turned the
Chinese against their advisors.”44 Sinologists and contemporary Chinese
studies scholars regularly mention Spence’s treatise as a cautionary against
outsiders trying to influence China’s development trajectory.
While Spence explored the lives of 16 Western advisors “from the 1620
through the 1950s,”45 this analysis hones in on the China engagement of 12
Europeans between 1980 and 2017. The five female and seven male indivi-
duals began their China engagement in the 1980s, 1990s, or 2000s by either
starting to learn Mandarin Chinese or visiting mainland China. The author
met eight of the 12 in China. Based on participant observation during project
work in China over a 13-year period between 2003 and 2015 on which the
analysis in these pages finds basis, plus in-depth interviews carried out
between summer 2014 and summer 2017, none of these interlocutors fit
into Spence’s characterisation of out-of-touch cultural imperialists hell-bent
on changing China against her will. European citizen diplomats exhibit high
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degrees of inter-cultural communication and collaboration competence.
What explains this great dissimilarity of research findings? The protagonists
of this study no longer suffer from the “tyranny of distance.”46 Whilst
Western advisors featured in Spence’s study often had to travel to China
for weeks if not months, the revolution in transportation sees a journey from
Europe to China now counted in hours. Similarly, the revolution in commu-
nication technology has enabled millions of European and Chinese citizens to
communicate in real-time regardless of their physical location.47
The pioneering European citizens featured in this research took advantage
of China’s opening to the outside world after the Cultural Revolution. They
either were invited or reached China on their own volition. Together with
their mainland Chinese partners, they have engaged in 11 activity fields of
disability, psychoanalysis, NGO twinning, human rights, climate change
mitigation, welfare of orphans, abandoned disabled children and young
people, youth dialogue, public participation, animal welfare, and inclusive
performing arts. The length of individual China engagement ranges from six
to 38 years—see Table 1. Together, they boast 266 years of practical China
experience. In some cases, this engagement has already ended, which hints at
the temporality of citizen diplomacy, an aspect further discussed when
reviewing findings from the in-depth interviews.
But when European citizen diplomats engage China, how does their
engagement differ from institutional diplomacy? In the following, it is clear
that the China engagement of the protagonists transcends what is commonly
referred to as “track one” or “track two” diplomacy. “Track one” can be
understood to mean “[a]n instrument of foreign policy for the establishment
and development of contacts between the governments of different states
through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective
parties.”48 “Track two,” on the other hand, has been defined as “an unofficial,
informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that
aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and
material resources in ways that might help to resolve their conflict… . [It] is
a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance,
to manage conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of public view and
without the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage.”49
One telling view is that neither “track one” nor “track two” on its own can
bring about lasting change. Instead there exists “multi-track diplomacy,”
which includes up to nine different and yet interlinked tracks. For this
analysis, this conception of “track 4” is of particular relevance. It relates to
“Private Citizen, or Peacemaking through Personal Involvement,” including
“the various ways that individual citizens become involved in peace and
development activities through citizen diplomacy, exchange programs, pri-
vate voluntary organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and special-
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interest groups.”50 As Table 2 shows, citizen diplomats perform different
roles and functions in comparison to institutional diplomats.
For diplomats, the preferred mode of operation is government-to-
government either on a bilateral or multilateral level. They are to pursue
national interests. In terms of their qualifications, diplomats tend to be
generalists with foreign language competencies; they enter the diplomatic
corps through a highly competitive application process. Regardless of rank,
their remit is subject to directives from higher-ranking officials. During their
stay abroad, they enjoy diplomatic immunity, and secondments to foreign
countries typically last between three and five years.
Citizen diplomats, on the other hand, operate on a people-to-people basis.
Transnational NGOs and their respective networks often support their
engagement. Citizen diplomats pursue bilateral and global public good ran-
ging from ecological to social and cultural concerns. In terms of their
qualifications, they are either generalists or specialists and often have foreign
language competency. In stark contrast to diplomats, there is no formal
admission process for citizen diplomats: they are a self-organised and self-
selected group. A citizen diplomat’s remit is also not subject to directives but
based on an individual’s vision, mission, and value orientation. When work-
ing abroad, citizen diplomats do not enjoy diplomatic immunity. Their
overseas engagement can last from a couple of years to a life-long engage-
ment with the partner country.
When European citizen diplomats carry out activities in China, they
require CCP officials to provide at least tacit approval, which can be with-
drawn at any time. Not enjoying diplomatic immunity, citizen diplomats
need to avoid crossing red lines—both visible in the form of laws and
regulations, as well as more invisible ones in the form of a host country’s
Table 2. Comparison between diplomats and citizen diplomats.
Diplomat Citizen diplomat
Preferred mode of
operation
Government-to-government
(G2G), either bilaterally or
multilaterally
People-to-people (P2P), often supported by
transnational NGOs and their networks
Core interest Pursuit of national interests Pursuit of bilateral or international public
goods
Qualification Generalist with foreign language
competency
Generalist or specialist with foreign
language competency
Admission Highly hierarchical, competitive
application process
Self-organised and self-selected group
Remit Subject to directives Subject to individual’s vision, mission and
value orientations
Legal status Diplomatic immunity Foreign citizen diplomats need to be
invited, demanded, appreciated or at least
tolerated
Overseas engagement Secondments overseas typically
last between three to five years
Between short-term and life-long
engagement with partner country
Notes: Author’s own table.
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political culture as well as societal norms and values.51 Hence, the importance
of structure—the need to have permissive conditions for citizen diplomacy.
At the same time, they need to be mindful of political and cultural sensitiv-
ities amongst their Chinese co-operation partners as well as the Chinese
public at large. This highlights the importance of agency—the ability of
individual Europeans to circumnavigate political cliffs and engage with
Chinese partners in culturally sensitive ways (Table 4).
During the previous discussion of citizen diplomacy principles, John Robert
Kelley, from the University of Southern California Center on Public
Diplomacy, suggested that in the twenty-first century, diplomacy is increas-
ingly a form of “behaviour.”52 To put the demanding concept of citizen
diplomacy into practice, individuals thus need to develop a variety of skills
and competencies to play the role of a citizen diplomat well. A defining aspect
of all featured European citizen diplomats is that they are not only “China
watching” but also “China practicing”—see Table 3.53 For these individuals,
China is not just an abstraction but also an activity field. Table 3 informs about
the engagement profiles of the European citizen diplomats, painting a complex
picture of “China watching”-related epistemological competencies and “China
practicing”-related professional skills. It reveals that less than one-half of the
protagonists have studied contemporary China as part of their higher educa-
tion. Similarly, the citizen diplomats’ Chinese language competencies range
from almost non-existent to fluent to near native. One of the striking simila-
rities of the European citizen diplomats is that repeated visits and prolonged
stays in China allowed them to build their knowledge and understanding of all
things Chinese.
In addition, all of the citizen diplomats have actively engaged in bridge
building activities.54 Depending on their specialisation, they also belong to
sector-specific communities of practice, which are both China-based and
transnational in nature, facilitated by online and offline activities, and
include both European and Chinese participants. According to an important
assessment:
[communities] of practice are formed by people who engage in a process of
collective learning in a shared domain of human endeavour: a tribe learning to
survive, a band of artists seeking new forms of expression, a group of engineers
working on similar problems, a clique of pupils defining their identity in the
school, a network of surgeons exploring novel techniques, a gathering of first-
time managers helping each other cope. In a nutshell: Communities of practice are
groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn
how to do it better as they interact regularly.55
The overview also reveals that organisational support by Europe- or
China-based NGOs/GONGOs is crucial for European citizen diplomats
to conduct capacity building trainings in China. Such NGO/GONGO
support is also key for conducting local pilot initiatives and engaging in
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collective policy advocacy in China. With this overview of the engagement
profiles of the featured Europeans, it is necessary to document how they
engaged in experiential learning and demonstrate how their process of
China engagement has contributed to the impact on the individual, orga-
nisational, and policy level.
The in-depth interviews over the period 2014 to 2017 showed that the 12
European citizen diplomats have been able to navigate the sometimes-
treacherous political-administrative landscape in mainland China thanks to
a high degree of inter-cultural communication and collaboration compe-
tence. Due to the public nature of their philanthropic work in China, much
of it reported in the English and Chinese media, European citizen diplomats
interviewed agreed to waive their anonymity. The newly developed hexagon
with its six key criteria below helps capture personality traits and trace
formative biographical experiences of the interviewees—see Table 4. It also
helps explain some of the paradoxical experiences of European citizens in
China, for example, the state of being excluded and included in Chinese
society at the same time as well as being self-aware of one’s own cultural
assumptions. The hexagon is an innovative new heuristic device that enables
researchers to better understand citizen diplomacy. Whilst employing the
hexagon in the context of this research about citizen diplomacy in China, it
also has application to scrutinise citizen diplomacy in other political and
regional contexts. The following presents key findings devolving from the
interviews based on six criteria.
Table 4. Hexagon of intercultural communication and collaboration competence.
(1) Open and attracted
to other ways
of seeing and doing
things
(4) Able to synergise diverse
approaches in order to seek
practical solutions to social
and/or environmental
problems
(2) Self-aware of one’s
own cultural
assumptions
(5) Willing to experiment
with new partnership models
under evolving political
framework conditions
(3) Able to relate to
others
(6) Able to shrug off
constraints of ideology or
discipline
Adopted from Irene Oehler’s “four basic requirements or competencies for intercultural cooperation”: quoted
in Hellkötter, Verstraete, Wen, Oehler, and Qilan, “Project Process,” 136; and “Ten Characteristics of
Successful Social Entrepreneurs” in John Elkington and Pamela Hartigan, The Power of Unreasonable
People. How Social Entrepreneurs Create Markets that Change the World (Boston, MA, 2008),).
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The first criterion relates to the citizen diplomats’ curiosity and willingness
to enhance their knowledge and understanding of all things Chinese, includ-
ing history, politics, economics, culture, society, and language. When asked
about their motivation to engage China, only a minority of interviewees
avowed a professional interest in China to be their key initial reason.
Instead, they mentioned the attractiveness of the Chinese language, evolving
friendships with Chinese people, and positive personal experiences in China
during short holidays, business trips, and prolonged periods of language
studies. Interviewees frequently referred to their initial China engagement
based on luck, chance, circumstance, coincidence, or serendipity. For some
interviewees, their initial contact with China led to a lasting personal and
professional engagement. A case in point is Jacqui Shurr.56 Her journey
started in 1997 when adopting a Chinese girl named Abigail Yan Le from
Xinjiang. When receiving their daughter, Jacqui and her husband, Jeff,
witnessed how the adoption of a Chinese girl by another British family ran
into major complications. In response, Shurr set up the British-based Good
Rock Foundation in the same year. From 1997 onwards, she and her Chinese
partners “committed [themselves] to improving the welfare of these orphans
and abandoned disabled children and young people.”57
The second criterion is self-awareness, “about becoming aware of one’s
own ‘cultural baggage’: our assumptions, our preferred way of communicat-
ing, as well as awareness about how our—preferred—way of doing things
may be perceived by others.”58 During the interviews, European citizen
diplomats spoke at length about how they perceived—and more importantly
dealt with—cultural differences during their China engagements. A recurring
theme during the interviews was the challenge of expectations for Europeans
to play a largely ascribed role of a “foreign expert” in China. A recent op-ed
by the Canadian China-based scholar, Daniel A. Bell, on his desire to
assimilate fully as a Chinese, has put this debate in perspective.59 Without
exception, interviewees doubted that Europeans could fully assimilate into
mainland Chinese society. At the same time, none had a colonial attitude.
Whilst Italo–British commentator Gabriele Corsetti has criticised the wide-
spread popular belief amongst many mainland Chinese that foreigners “are
always going to be a transient ‘guest’ with one foot back in your own country
who can never really hold a stake in Chinese society,”60 many interviewees
were less fazed about this ambiguity. Whilst perfectly aware that the label of
“foreigner” set them apart from an imagined category of “the Chinese,” they
did not necessarily object to this process of “otherisation.”61 And whilst the
majority of interviewees did not necessarily consider themselves “expert,”
they mostly considered this label as an inspiration to perform particularly
well in inter-cultural encounters with their Chinese partners.
What explains the willingness amongst European citizens to play the role
of “foreign expert”?62 Whilst this role constrains the ability of European
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citizen diplomats to integrate fully into Chinese society, it also shields them
from assimilationist pressures, for instance, the expectation for the “foreign
expert” to think and behave like a Chinese. In the words of Chinese law
expert Flora Sapio, “it is a category that can make you a lot richer, because it
enables like a 360 degree expansion of your views.”63 The experiences of the
German psychoanalyst, Alf Gerlach, best illustrate the paradox of
a perception as “the other” and simultaneously being sufficiently included
to gain deep insights into Chinese society. He first visited mainland China in
the early 1980s. When starting to offer psychotherapy training in 1997, he
conducted self-experience talks with his Chinese trainees. During his inter-
view, he recounted how the role as a transient guest also opened up oppor-
tunities to engage in new and novel ways: “it triggered a fantasy. ‘Now I can
speak,’ with a very idealised foreigner, who is here, and who opens a space,
who can keep it confidential.”64 As a complete outsider, Gerlach thereby
gained deep insights into the psyche of mainland Chinese psychiatrists and
psychologists, who at the ages of 30 to 35 years were still suffering from the
traumata of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).
The interviews demonstrate that the European citizen diplomats view their
relationships with Chinese partners—both on the individual and organisa-
tional level—as “an end and not only a means toward some other end.”65
Stephen Hallett OBE, chair and co-founder of the British-based disability
NGO China Vision, exemplifies their ability to empathise with Chinese
people. He describes himself as someone whose “partial sight has helped
give him a clearer insight into the lives of disadvantaged people in China.”66
Citizen diplomat emphasis on a shared humanity should not become what
Francois Jullien has called “a weak universality, reduced, lazy, limiting itself
to a single experience”67; nor is it a form of cultural relativism.68 An
organisational, applied, psychoanalytic, and medical anthropologist,
Howard Stein, has described the ability of citizen diplomats to avoid taking
sides, and their openness to integrate conflicting points of views as a form of
“emotional inclusiveness.”69 Citizen diplomats have “a passionate disinterest
in search of deeper realities” and exhibit tolerance “for ambiguity, together
with a realistic appraisal of similarities and differences between groups …
[which] must also be accompanied with an ability to examine one’s own
ideals, expectations, and disappointments that regulate self-esteem.”70
The qualities that Stein calls for in citizen diplomats were on display in the
interview with Phil Entwistle, a former visiting fellow at Berlin’s Mercator
Institute for China Studies. Reflecting on the effect of immersing himself in
Chinese culture and society, he observed that “being involved in the Chinese
culture for so long, I think it has lost its exoticism, its romanticism. I see all
its faults as well as its very many lovely things.”71 Patrick Schroeder’s work
on climate change mitigation in China can serve as another good instance of
“emotional inclusiveness” described by Stein. In the interview, he explained,
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in terms of climate change, the Chinese emissions have been soaring. To save the
global climate, you need to do something about China. Let me put it that way.
With the Germans, this is a kind of national obsession to be concerned about
global commons, like the climate, or the rain forest or coral reefs. But concerns
about these does not mean necessarily a concern about the people in Brazil, or
people in China. Or fishermen who depend on coral reefs for their livelihood. So
then, the next stage is they want to protect these global commons but by being
there and trying to find some solutions, you develop relationships with people in
these contexts. And, then it not only becomes the global commons, the climate, it
is not the only motivation. Because then you also become concerned about the
people. You develop these relationships. And these are often very good relation-
ships. And then what comes to this in China, is of course also the issue of air
pollution. So by living in Beijing through the smog crisis, which has been parti-
cularly bad over the past five, six, seven years, so basically you breathe the same air
as the average person on the street. It is the same problem we are trying to address
from a different perspective. And then everybody becomes concerned about health.
There is not a difference now between “the other” and yourself.72
The fourth criterion relates to citizen diplomat ability to collaborate with
local partners critically, creatively, and constructively. Stein has argued that
the “empathic capacity for temporarily extending oneself into another, and or
briefly incorporating another into oneself in order to look more closely—
whilst remaining secure enough to remain oneself and to be capable of
transcending that very self—is what in citizen diplomacy is both most
necessary and most difficult to do.”73 So what have European citizen diplo-
mats experienced in their open-ended engagement processes? And to what
extent have they been able to synthesise European and Chinese practices?
During their conversations, none of the interviewees withheld their judg-
ments about particular problems that China faces. At the same time, they
also expressed the need to suspend such judgments in inter-cultural encoun-
ters with Chinese people. Interviewees considered the suspension of judg-
ment not in tactical terms—a diplomatic way to avoid antagonistic conflicts
—but as a pedagogical and pragmatic necessity. In the words of animal
welfare activist Joy Leney, “everything really boils down to educating people,
creating awareness and letting them find their own compassionate path.
I fear that hammering people over their head and being openly critical and
shaming and embarrassing is not a very pleasant route to go down. I don’t
think it is a very sensible route to go down… . I tend to think that through
education one would hope that individuals and societies evolve. The route we
would hope they would evolve is to be more caring, humane, compassionate,
call it what you like. But I don’t think any of us really like to be told we
should or we shouldn’t do this or that.”74
A recurring theme throughout the interviews was the need for critical
pedagogy in an individual’s China engagement, which avoids the pitfalls of
a unilateral and paternalistic imposition of pre-conceived ideas and practices
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on Chinese counterparts. Nicola Macbean, founder and director of the
London-based human rights organisation, The Rights Practice, revealed
that she similarly subscribes to a developmental and improvement-oriented
approach to China.75 When reflecting about her own practical experiences
with inter-cultural communication and collaboration when implementing the
project “High Speed Urbanization in China-Architecture, Art and Culture,”
the German Sinologist and academic, Nora Sausmikat, suggested, “it was not
the different culture of the countries but more the different culture of
European and Chinese professionals which triggered challenges. Cognitive,
emotional or aesthetic approaches needed to be combined—national cultural
differences became more and more irrelevant.”76
European practitioners such as Dave Carey, from an inclusive British theatre
company, and Weitz recalled how working in China helped them reflect upon
and refine their professional practices. Carey recalled a theatre workshop with
Chinese children in Shanghai that did not go as planned, an experience that
motivated him to thoroughly redesign a workshop in Zhuhai: “I improved as
a practitioner more in those twenty four hours than in the previous ten years,
without a doubt.”77 Weitz similarly found the China experience to be trans-
formative: “Working in China has led to changes in my professional practice.
But not entirely. In some aspects, the China experience has also confirmed
some of my deeply held convictions… . In our later workshops we have of
course addressed the issue of methodology. And yet we have also increasingly
discussed the issue of attitude. Then we are dealing with the question what
I am doing as a facilitator, where I suggest, don’t interfere too much, do less.
We have been working much more on the process side of things. This is very
exciting. I never felt that I am a kind of guru who has to deliver and gets
nothing in return. I have learned a lot in China.”78
The discussion so far has mostly focused on the interviewees’ individual
attitudes, inter-cultural communication styles, and reported professional
practices. None of the European citizen diplomats, however, would have
been able to sustain their China engagement over time without some form
of organisational support. Three distinctive pathways exist in terms of their
China engagement. Four interviewees engaged China primarily in their
individual capacity as highly trained professionals. A second and slightly
bigger group of six established their own China-related NGO as a form of
institutionalised bridge between Europe and China. A third and final group
of three worked in their professional capacity for existing European or
Chinese NGOs or GONGOs.
Whilst the three organisational pathways have provided these citizen
diplomats with engagement opportunities, their experiences following each
of the three pathways remain mixed. Working in China primarily in his
individual capacity, Carey had to engage with a number of Chinese grass-
roots NGOs before realising that Chinese corporate partners might be more
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suitable for his London-based theatre company to extend its reach to China.
Weitz, on the other hand, pointed out that in his view, the ultimate goal of
a capacity builder is to make oneself superfluous. His role in recent years has
increasingly transitioned from workshop facilitator to coach or mentor for
Chinese civil society practitioners. For Europeans more invested in China
due either to their China-related education and professional experience or
the fact that they founded China-related NGOs, the temporality of citizen
diplomacy can be more of a challenge.
Seeing the recently enacted Chinese Overseas NGO Law as too big a hurdle to
overcome, Shurr decided to dissolve the Good Rock Foundation on
31 December 2016. She had previously operated projects and programmes in
Xinjiang province for almost 20 years. Not all challenges, however, relate to
party-state interference. Another European citizen diplomat, who agreed to an
interview on the condition of anonymity, talked about societal resistance. The
interviewee complained about the lack of solidarity between Chinese civil society
organisations and foreign NGO start-ups, pointing out, “if you represent an
organisation that can be competitive on a fundraising level, they will just
completely not engage with you, even on the individual level.” The China
Britain Youth Association, co-founded by Entwistle, on the other hand, dis-
solved due to domestic resource constraints. Other Europe-based NGOs like
China Vision, the German–Chinese Academy for Psychotherapy, The Rights
Practice, and Stiftung Asienhaus so far have been able to maintain their China-
presence by collaborating with Chinese government organisations, GONGOs,
and academic as well as grassroots organisations. The open-ended nature and
unpredictability of some Europe–Chinese partnerships suggests that European
citizen diplomats have been willing to take on considerable risks when experi-
menting with new partnership models under evolving political framework con-
ditions. The considerable length of their China engagement, ranging from six to
38 years, is a testament to their tenacity. Yet a final question remains, how do
they view the outcomes or impact of their often decades-long work in China?
Given the complex challenges that citizen diplomacy in China entails,
a sceptic could wonder about the overall impact of this particular form of
China engagement. When asked about their greatest achievement during
their China engagement, interviewees were both confident and also very
humble about their various contributions, which they often attributed to
their Chinese partners. Mindful of the difference between attribution and
contribution,79 interviewees told the author how in their view they have
contributed to a better understanding of contemporary China. This occurred
through open-access publications, engagement in bridge building, building
up human capital amongst Chinese individuals, strengthening China-based
civil society organisations and networks through capacity building training
and local pilot activities, and engaging in collective policy entrepreneurship—
for more details see Table 5.
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Another remarkable finding was howChina engagement affected the European
citizen diplomats themselves. For many interviewees, their experiences not only
provided deep insights into China but also helped refine their ownworldviews and
ideology. Sausmikat, Fabian, Entwistle, Sapio, Schroeder, and Shurr suggest that
European citizen diplomats have not only contributed to China’s development,
but also that their engagement had a profound and transformative effect on their
own personal development. Commenting on the advantages of being not just
critical vis-à-vis China but also western countries, Sausmikat commented that it
“helps a lot to deal with the frustrations. If you look at it from a very long-term
perspective and question your own role, when you question the role of the West,
this helps you to eat crow… . What would be useful is to have a fundamentally
self-critical perspective on ourselves.”80 When placing European experts in
Chinese civil society organisations during his work for the Centre for
International Migration and Development, Fabian learnt from his Chinese coun-
terparts “the art of negotiation and the ability to think more in terms of process
categories.”81 Entwistle described how his engagement made him re-evaluate his
previously held political views: “I think the whole China experience has made me
a lot more liberal … a lot more anti-authoritarian, both when it comes to
economics and politics.”82 Sapio highlighted how she learnt to shrug off con-
straints of ideology and discipline: “I changedmy ideological perspective a lot over
the years as well”; she considered “the ability to translate concepts and ideas across
systems” as one of the key benefits from years of researching and engaging
practically with China.83 Schroeder described how his experience made him
understand the virtue of combining theory with practise and how his interest in
climate changemitigation led to a desire to make a positive contribution to China.
In his words, “you can approach China as an academic subject and write about it.
And you can do that very well from the distance. But what you are writing will
then always be within the kind of, like, Western discourse on China, I think. So,
yes, the question is if you want to… if it is in China as a place, if you are interested
in China as a culture, if you are interested in the people who live there, of course
you will have to spend some time living there. This way you run in[to] the tension
between East and West, or dichotomies, and thinking of ‘the other.’ All of this…
experience of being in China, the dichotomies are diluted to some degree.”84 For
some citizen diplomats, the China experience has sharpened their sense for the
severity of some of the challenges China’s society is currently facing. Looking back
on her now-concluded engagement, Shurr reflected on the need within Chinese
society to tackle thorny and unresolved issues such as child abuse.85
Society-centric citizen diplomacy is not just part of the global discourse
about “new” diplomacy; it is also gaining traction as a new concept in
European foreign policy-making towards China. By documenting the experi-
ential learning of these citizen diplomats and whilst citizen diplomacy may be
a new concept in EU–China relations, it has already been practised in China
since the early 1980s. Making use of the newly developed hexagon of inter-
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cultural communication and collaboration competence, European citizen
diplomats have managed to navigate the sometimes-treacherous political-
administrative landscape in mainland China.
During the interviews, European citizen diplomats were asked how their
work in China could be better supported. To some surprise, very few inter-
viewees made suggestions about how European governments could support
their activities. One key takeaway has been that none of the interviewees
expressed a particular desire to act on behalf the EU or any of its member-
states. This finding suggests that society-centric citizen diplomacy in China
appears as complementary to institutional diplomacy and not its replace-
ment. Yet, this does not mean that European foreign policy-makers should
ignore the manifold contributions that citizen diplomats have made to
China’s development process.
It is important to caution against any attempt to instrumentalise citizen
diplomats. Reflecting on the debate in Britain about soft-power projection,
Timothy Jenkins, from the University of Southern California Center on
Public Diplomacy, argued that “(most) BBC World Service journalists do
not see themselves as soft power assets. UK University lecturers do not set
out to create an Anglophile network of world leaders; and UK musicians and
actors do not press the Hollywood flesh out of a sense of duty to commu-
nicate their country’s cultural superiority. Regardless of intent, these indivi-
duals and institutions speak volumes about UK governance, culture, and
values and can create the right conditions to convert goodwill into global
influence. Direct government control over activities or institutions that
positively influence foreign publics often invites suspicion. Soft power activ-
ity is quickly undermined if it comes across as lacking in authenticity or as
government propaganda.”86
What could be done, however, is for the EU and its member-states to
continue with what the former German foreign minister and current
president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has called a process of “intertwining
and integration” with both neighbouring and far-flung countries.87 For
this work on an institutional level, the EU would most likely have to put
money where its mouth is. To strengthen the rather weak and under-
developed third pillar of EU–China relations—the High Level People-to-
People Dialogue—the European Commission should consider the estab-
lishment of an EU–China People-to-People Dialogue Support Facility.
Here the established protocols of the EU–China Policy Dialogue Support
Facility II could provide a useful reference.88 As the Dialogue aims to
“help build mutual trust and consolidate intercultural understanding
between EU and China,”89 it could be given a remit to promote grassroots-
level dialogue between Europe and China in the eight fields of education,
environment, culture, civil society, public sector reform, disability, gender
and LGBT, and youth. By linking European and Chinese civil societies,
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there would be more opportunities for European and Chinese citizens to
engage with one another. Private foundations should similarly support
bridge building activities between Europe and China.
To a certain extent, however, the success or failure of such efforts to
include laymen in EU–China relations will depend on the future trajectory
of China’s political development. As Fabian warns, “[a] last challenge
relates to the way the Chinese government will position itself towards
EU–China citizen diplomacy in the future. The credibility of citizen
diplomacy presupposes that the states involved loosen their control.
States can promote citizen diplomacy and build state-society alliances.
But if they try to control citizen diplomacy activities in an authoritarian
way the credibility of these are questioned and finally damaged.”90
Conservative members within China’s party-state may indeed object to
citizen diplomacy, but such resistance should not be exaggerated. Whilst
China’s “slow-motion revolution has been stopped in its tracks” by the
current Xi/Li administration,91 European citizen diplomacy in China has
already survived fairly dramatic political downturns such as the crackdown
on China’s country-wide anti-corruption and pro-democracy movement in
1989. This is why—if history is any indication of the future—European
citizen diplomacy will continue to thrive in EU–China relations regardless
of the vicissitudes of Chinese domestic politics.
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